Good afternoon, my name is Michael A. Bolton. I am the Inspector General for the United States Capitol Police (USCP or Department). I have been with the Inspector General’s office since 2006. In January 2019, I was appointed as the Inspector General. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you, the Committee on Senate Rules and Administration, to discuss our Review of Events in regards to USCP’s Departmental Operation, Programs and Policies that were in affect during January 6, 2021.

I would like to extend my appreciation to the Committee for holding this hearing. This hearing is different in many ways. I am addressing not only Committee members exercising their Constitutional Role of Oversight, but I am testifying to witnesses, as well as, survivors who are affected by the events of January 6, 2021. On January 6, 2021, a physical security breach of U.S. Capitol Building occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. My goal is to provide each of you with a better understanding of how the events of January 6, 2021 occurred in relation to the preparation and response of the Department. Other factors were involved and other entities are reviewing those aspects outside the USCP Department. I will discuss the non-law enforcement sensitive findings detailed in my four “Flash Reports.” Any law enforcement sensitive questions can be answered in a “closed door” setting.

Shortly after the events of January 6th, I notified the Department, Board and the Committees that my office would be suspending all future projects listed in the OIG Annual Plan for 2021 to allow my entire staff to conduct a full review of these events. In order to accomplish this goal, both OIG Audit and Investigations, would combine their collective talents to achieve a complete review of the Department. In addition to my staff, I brought on two additional
contractors with the expertise and knowledge to assist my Office. A retired Deputy Assistant Director for the United States Secret Service and a retired Senior Special Agent Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigations.

Our reports are not designed nor intended to cast blame on any one individual or group. These reports are intended to be an independent objective review of the Department’s programs and operations to better protect the Capitol Complex, members, staff, visitors, and the rank and file officers, who have shown their commitment and bravery each and every day by keeping all safe. A collective effort must be undertaken, to ensure that each and every officer, when their shift is over, gets to go home to their families. As well as the safety of those who work and visit the first branch of government.

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, the USCP Office of Inspector General began a review of the operations and programs that were in place prior to and during the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objective, for this review, is to determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of Members of Congress, their Staff and the Capitol Complex, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes that complied with Department policies and procedures and, (3) complied with applicable laws and regulations. The scope included reviewing the controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and the response during the takeover of the Capitol building. Our recommendations are made by conducting interviews, document reviews, the combined knowledge and expertise of my staff and following best practices throughout the Federal Government of those relevant agencies with similar functions of the Department.

We are currently providing the Department, Board and Committees, a series of flash reports every 30 days. We are reviewing each element within the Department, noting any areas for improvement. We are providing any corresponding recommendations to compel the Department to move towards a Protective Agency as opposed to a Police Agency. At the time of this hearing, my office has completed four flash reports. The first report was a review of operational planning for January 6th including a review of the Intelligence gathering process
required for the operational plan that related to January 6\textsuperscript{th}. Our second flash report focused on the Civil Disturbance Unit and the Intelligence Division as a whole. Our third flash report, focused on threat assessment and the counter-surveillance unit. Our fourth flash report focused on the Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders Unit. We anticipated our comprehensive Review would extend for the remainder of FY 2021. Additional reviews will include Manpower usage (communication, makeup and structure of the command staff), Training, Security Services Bureau, K-9. Essentially almost every element and component of the Department.

As our work continues, my office sees continuing areas in our findings that need to be addressed. Those areas are Intelligence, Training, Operational Planning, and cultural change. In regards to culture change, we see that the Department needs to move away from the thought process as a traditional Police Department and move to the posture as a Protective Agency. A police department is geared to being reactive. A crime is committed; police respond and make an arrest. Whereas, a Protective Agency is postured to being proactive to prevent events such as January 6\textsuperscript{th}.

Our first flash report was designed to communicate any deficiencies with the Department’s operational planning and intelligence for planned demonstrations on January 6, 2021. The deficiencies included the following (a) lack of a comprehensive operational plan or adequate guidance for operational planning, (b) failure to disseminate relevant information obtained from outside sources, (c) lack of consensus on the interpretation of threat analyses, (d) dissemination of conflicting intelligence, and (e) lack of security clearances.

In order to improve its operational planning capabilities, USCP should implement detailed guidance for operational planning. The guidance should include policies and procedures that designate the entity or entities responsible for overseeing the operational planning and execution process, require documentation of supervisory review and approval, and standardize planning document formats. All Department employees should be required to obtain and maintain a security clearance as a condition of employment. Guidance should also require that individual units develop plans and coordinate those plans with other units for a comprehensive,
Department-wide effort. Additionally, the guidance should communicate when specific operational planning documents are required. For example, the Department could use a multi-tiered system based on the anticipated size and scope of an event as criteria for determining the required level of operational planning documentation it needs to prepare.

Implementing formal guidance requiring that employees communicate any intelligence reports and concerns from external sources to appropriate commanders would improve USCP’s ability to effectively disseminate intelligence throughout the Department. Providing additional training to personnel on how to better understand intelligence assessments and an increased role for Department entities that have intelligence analysis and dissemination responsibilities in operational planning would also improve USCP’s ability to achieve a consensus on threat analyses. Furthermore, the Department should require supervisory review and approval for intelligence products to ensure the products are supported by relevant intelligence information and are internally consistent. Lastly, receiving classified briefings on emerging threats and tactics would better prepare the Department’s sworn and operational civilian employees to identify and counter threats and tactics in the field.

The Department lacked adequate guidance for operational planning. USCP did not have policies and procedures in place that communicated which personnel were responsible for operational planning, what type of operational planning documents its personnel should prepare, nor when its personnel should prepare operational planning documents. Additionally, USCP lacked guidance requiring that its various entities coordinate their planning efforts into a comprehensive plan.

Interviews with Department officials revealed inconsistencies in the types of planning documents USCP should have prepared for January 6, 2021. Former Chief of Police Steven Sund stated the Department used documents commonly referred to as a “Plan of Action” for large events and that such a Plan of Action signed by an Assistant Chief should have existed for the events of January 6, 2021. Former Chief Sund also stated that the Commander of the USB Capitol Division should have completed an “Incident Action Plan” for the Joint Session of Congress. Former Chief Sund stated that he believed there were Department policies addressing
those planning documents. However, we could not find any policies that clearly addressed creation of those specific planning documents.

According to the OSB official responsible for preparing the CDU Plan, prior to the summer of 2020 there were no formal planning documents for CDU events. After protest activity during the summer of 2020, OSB began utilizing a planning document from the International Association of Chiefs of Police as a guide for creating such a plan. The official stated that OSB forwards a CDU Operational Plan by email to an Assistant Chief for approval and OSB receives a confirmation with no correspondence log or other documented approval. Certain CDU commanders provide input to the plan but OSB does not distribute the plan to any other Department commanders. Several Department officials stated that they were not familiar with CDU Operational Plan for January 6, 2021.

USCP failed to disseminate relevant information obtained from outside sources, lacked consensus on the interpretation of threat analyses, and disseminated conflicting intelligence information regarding planned events for January 6, 2021. Additionally, the Department did not require that all of its sworn and operational civilian employees obtain security clearances.

USCP failed to disseminate relevant information obtained from outside sources regarding planned events for January 6, 2021. According to the Department’s timeline, on January 5, 2021, at approximately 7 p.m. to 8 p.m., a USCP task force agent embedded with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) emailed IOS a memorandum from the FBI Norfolk Division providing additional details regarding the January 6, 2021, event.

Acting Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations stated that the memorandum was a “Situational Information Report,” which he viewed differently than an Intelligence Assessment because Situational Information Reports are not necessarily authenticated or followed-up; the FBI produces them to communicate something its agents saw or learned. Acting Assistant Chief acknowledged it was hard to view it that way after January 6, 2021. Acting Assistant Chief also stated that to his knowledge the FBI never formally sent the memorandum to USCP. The FBI Norfolk Division produced the document, and it was then
placed on an FBI intranet or other internal system. Late in the evening on January 5, 2021, a USCP task force officer (TFO) assigned to the FBI Guardian Squad Task Force pulled the memorandum from the FBI system and emailed it to a USCP IOS email distribution list.

According to an Acting Assistant Chief, the memorandum did not surface again until it was attached to an information package sent out late on January 6, 2021, after the security breach occurred. In the days following January 6, 2021, the memorandum began to surface in the media and Members of Congress began to ask USCP if it had received it. The Department was originally under the impression that it had not received the document until a Department official inquired with USCP’s TFOs about it. An Acting Assistant Chief stated that to his knowledge, prior to the events of January 6, 2021, the memorandum did not make it out of the IOS email distribution list to IICD or other Department commanders.

According to an Acting Assistant Chief, after January 6, 2021, the FBI produced a similar situational report about a threat to the State of the Union, but USCP received that report through its formal channels with the Joint Terrorism Task Force executive board, which includes the Acting Assistant Chief and Acting Chief Pittman. As of February 11, 2021, PSB requires that all reports or concerns must be sent to the Investigations Division as well as IICD Commanders—which was not required or always happening before January 6, 2021. Implementing formal guidance requiring that employees communicate any intelligence reports and concerns from external sources to appropriate commanders would significantly improve the ability of USCP to effectively disseminate intelligence throughout the Department.

Interviews with USCP officials revealed a lack of consensus about whether intelligence information regarding planned events on January 6, 2021, actually indicated specific known threats to the Joint Session of Congress. Certain officials believed USCP intelligence products indicated there may be threats but did not identify anything specific, while other officials believed it would be inaccurate to state that there were no known specific threats to the Joint Session based on those same USCP intelligence products.
The threat analysis in the CDU Operational Plan for January 6, 2021, dated January 5, 2021, states, “At this time there are no specific known threats related to the Joint Session of Congress – Electoral College Vote Certification.” While a prior version of Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468, dated December 16, 2020, contains the exact same statement and updated versions of the assessment published later that month contain similar language, the final version dated January 3, 2021, does not contain that statement. The IICD Director stated that IICD periodically revised the assessment as it received more information, and IICD updated the final version based on concerns communicated by the Department’s law enforcement partners. An OSB official responsible for preparing the CDU Operational Plan dated January 5, 2021, admitted it was most likely an error on their part that the threat analysis in the plan was not updated. However, multiple Department officials with intelligence dissemination responsibilities stated they had never even seen the threat analysis included in the CDU Operational Plan dated January 5, 2021.

Providing additional training to personnel on how to better understand and interpret intelligence assessments and requiring that any threat analyses included in operational planning are coordinated with Department entities with intelligence analysis and dissemination responsibilities would improve USCP ability to achieve a consensus on its threat analyses.

Our second flash report communicated deficiencies with the Department’s Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) and intelligence operations. As part of our review, OIG also conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department’s implementation of recommendations contained in Follow-up Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Intelligence Analysis Division, Investigative Number 2018-I-0008, dated March 2019, to confirm the Department took the corrective actions in implementing the recommendations.

USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for CDU defining its responsibilities, duties, composition, equipment, and training. CDU was operating at a decreased level of readiness because of a lack of standards for equipment, deficiencies noted from the events of January 6, 2021, a lapse in certain certifications, an inaccurate CDU roster,
staffing concerns for the unit, quarterly audits that were not performed, and property inventories not in compliance with guidance.

The Department should implement detailed policies and procedures that address several aspects of CDU and its operations. Implementation of the Department’s formal training guidance, requirements, and lesson plans is crucial to its mission. Formalizing and implementing equipment standards will provide officers with proper functioning equipment. Additionally, the Department should require that all types of weapon systems classified as less lethal are staged prior to large events as well as ensure that additional CDU Grenadiers are trained and certified.

Ensuring that the Department conducts periodic safety inspections would prevent expired munitions from being deployed and used. Also, a formal process is needed for management within CDU to ensure that when munitions do expire they are exchanged appropriately with the Property and Asset Management Division for proper disposal in a timely manner. Further, USCP should store its riot shields in the proper temperature-stable climate to prevent compromise of the riot shield’s life span.

USCP Directive 2055.001, *Specialty Pay Program*, effective August 1, 2019, states that “the Chief of Police is authorized to establish and determine positions within the USCP as specialty assignments or requiring certain proficiencies eligible for additional compensation.” Exploring options for incentivizing the CDU Program would go a long way toward increasing participation because of its hazardous nature. As well, holding management accountable for incomplete CDU audits would enforce controls.

Based on our follow-up analysis, a condition identified in two previous reports, the Department’s failure to update and document evaluations of its intelligence priorities reemerged. We also identified intelligence related deficiencies with the Department’s organizational structure, training, professional standards, internal controls, and capability to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information.
To increase the efficiency of its intelligence resources, the Department should consider reorganizing its intelligence functions into a single intelligence bureau. A formal Intelligence Training Program is necessary; otherwise, the Department cannot ensure the proper training of its intelligence employees or ensure that they are up to date on policies and procedures related to Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) personnel duties. Furthermore, implementing additional formal guidance that applies to USCP’s collection, processing, and reporting of information would improve its ability to effectively disseminate intelligence throughout the Department. Lastly, the Department should address gaps in meeting the intelligence needs of its operational stakeholders; the lack of training, certification, or professional standards for its intelligence analysts; and determine the necessary staffing, security clearances, and technology IICD needs to accomplish its mission.

Our third Flash Report reflects the continuing need for the Department to focus on the four areas of Intelligence, Training, Operational Planning and cultural change.

Based on ongoing work, this flash report is designed to communicate any deficiencies with the Department’s counter-surveillance and threat assessment operations. Deficiencies included (a) outdated or vague guidance, (b) failure to adequately report stop or contact activities, (c) lack of a dedicated counter-surveillance entity, (d) insufficient resources for supporting counter-surveillance operations, and (e) inadequate resources for supporting its Threat Assessment Section (TAS).

The Department did not adequately provide detailed and up-to-date guidance in place for its counter-surveillance and threat assessment operations, which could have led to unclear guidance and accountability. Additionally, a lack of clear and detailed communication procedures could have increased inefficiencies with processes as well as led to critical counter-surveillance information not being appropriately communicated throughout the Department. Furthermore, the Department did not adequately document, collect, and analyze PD-76 USCP Stop or Contact Reports, which may have impeded its ability to identify trends or patterns that warranted further investigation or dissemination.
A stand-alone entity, with a defined mission dedicated to counter-surveillance activities in support of protecting the Congressional Community, would improve the Department’s ability to identify and disrupt individuals or groups intent on engaging in illegal activity directed at the Congressional Community and its legislative process. The entity should be sufficiently staffed to accomplish its mission and have adequate resources, including dedicated analyst support and a central desk to exploit, investigate, disseminate, and triage information in real time.

Although the Department has increased the number of Full-Time Employees within TAS, the section continues to experience manpower issues. In a previous report, OIG found TAS caseloads steadily increased from the beginning of the calendar year 2017 through the end of 2019. Department officials and TAS agents stated that increased caseloads as well as staffing levels were some of the greatest challenges for TAS. TAS did not have Investigative Analysis and TAS agents performed tasks, such as database checks, that Investigative Analysts performed at other agencies. OIG found allowing Investigative Analysts to assume some responsibilities from agents would help TAS maintain a manageable caseload for its staff.

Our fourth Flash Report reflects the continuing need for the Department to focus on the four areas of Intelligence, Training, Operational Planning and cultural change.

Based on ongoing work, our flash report is designed to communicate deficiencies with the Department’s Containment Emergency Response Team (CERT) and First Responders Unit (FRU) operations. In Report Number 2021-I-0003-A, Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Operational Planning and Intelligence, dated February 2021, OIG reported a lack of a comprehensive, Department-wide operational plan and inconsistencies in how the Department planned to use CERT on January 6, 2021. Our work revealed further deficiencies and inconsistencies with how the Department planned to use CERT on January 6, 2021. In Report Number 2021-I-0003-A, OIG recommended that in order to improve its operational planning capabilities, USCP should implement detailed guidance for operational planning.
The Department should increase oversight and define a mission for CERT that better supports its primary mission of security and protection of Congress. Realigning CERT from the Special Operations Division (SOD) to the Protective Service Bureau (PSB) would provide the Department more opportunities for using CERT in support of protection details, congressional delegations, air operations, and motorcades. Implementing recurring training between CERT and other USCP elements it may support and assuming a greater role in pursuing appropriate, mission driven training opportunities for CERT from its Federal partner agencies would assist the Department in developing competencies within CERT that are appropriate for improving the Department’s ability to achieve its mission. The Department did not have adequate, updated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in place for CERT, and the Department did not always comply with guidance related to tactical command, communication device function checks, instructor certification, weapons qualifications, or equipment inventories.

The Department did not have adequate, updated SOPs in place for FRU operations. A lack of adequate and updated policies and procedures can create ambiguity and lack of accountability and coordination. As well, a lack of adequate policies and procedures can also inhibit readiness for FRU and loss of Department equipment. Additionally, completion of monthly remote locking devices drills and resources such as less lethal weapons, mountain bicycles, physical access, and training are needed for FRU to successfully complete its mission.

Our review again highlights the areas in which the Department needs to address as a whole in Leadership, Training, Planning, and Cultural Change. Specifically, the Department needs to clearly define the mission, expectations, and skill sets needed for both CERT and FRU. CERT is not a SWAT team nor should they ever be considered one. SWAT is a police function whereas CERT needs to be a tactical team supporting the overall mission of the Capitol Police. The same can be said for the role and responsibilities for FRU.

In Report Number OIG-2018-06, OIG reported that CERT training did not always reinforce skills appropriate for the mission of the Department and that concentrating more on training such as close quarter battle, motorcades, and perimeter security would allow CERT to maximize its
training opportunities by focusing on areas that reinforce skills appropriate for the Department’s mission.

OIG also found that CERT training lacked segregation of duties because CERT conducted most of its own training and maintained its own training records. OIG recommended the Department determine which types of training develop competencies within CERT appropriate for improving the Department’s ability to achieve its mission and have its Training Services Bureau take a greater role in CERT training to achieve better segregation of duties.

CERT, SOD, and PSB officials all stated that CERT should train more often with other Department elements it may deploy to support such as DPD, CDU, FRU, and the Crisis Negotiation Team. Officials cited inadequate staffing and a lack of available training facilities as challenges to having CERT train with those elements.

Officials also stated that the Department’s training facilities at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Cheltenham, Maryland did not meet their training needs. A CERT official stated that CERT and CDU tactics differed and when CERT deploys less lethal munitions it is for different situations than when CDU deploys them. According to that official, CERT never trains with CDU and CERT would “wing it” during a deployment if CERT had to assist CDU because there isn’t any coordination between them. There is not an understanding of unit tactics so they know what the other is doing during events based off training or consistent operations with the other. Additionally, the official could not recall CERT and DPD holding any joint training on evacuations and stated they had no idea what tactics DPD currently uses during Member evacuations. The official estimated CERT and DPD had only trained in tactics together a couple of times over the course of their career.

Various CERT officials stated that a lack of access to adequate training facilities was a recurring challenge for CERT and that developing contacts with partner agencies was essential for gaining training opportunities at the agency’s facilities. The officials also stated that another challenge was that CERT never had an opportunity to train inside the Capitol. A CERT official stated that coordinating CERT training was one of their main responsibilities and that because of the
challenge of scheduling training at the Department’s facilities at FLETC Cheltenham and in the local District of Columbia area at free of charge sites, CERT had contracted with privately owned entities to train its personnel in firearm marksmanship and other tactics at facilities located outside of the local District of Columbia area.

Research into the privately owned entities revealed that one of the entities, Northern Red, Inc. (Northern Red), had questionable content on its website. During 2018 and 2019, the Department spent $90,075 for CERT to train with Northern Red. The home page of the company’s website uses the motto or slogan, “For those who have hunted armed men training is never the same.” While some of the content could have multiple meanings, their use at Department-provided training could lead employees to feel unsafe or uncomfortable. Furthermore, USCP participation at training Northern Red provided could also lead individuals to believe that USCP sanctions the use of such content. As a result, OIG issued Report Number OIG-2021-07, *Management Advisory Report: Containment Emergency Response Team Contractor*, dated May 26, 2021, to communicate this information to the Department and recommended that it review the appropriateness of utilizing Northern Red for further training.

To ensure that CERT receives appropriate, mission driven training, the Department and its Training Services Bureau should assume a greater role in pursuing training opportunities for CERT from Federal partner agencies. Such a move would also allow CERT leadership to focus on CERT operations instead of training coordination. Implementing recurring training between CERT and other USCP elements it may support and assuming a greater role in pursuing appropriate, mission driven training opportunities for CERT from its Federal partner agencies would assist the Department in developing competencies within CERT that are appropriate for improving the Department’s ability to achieve its mission.

USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for FRU defining its overall operations. Additionally, FRU lacked resources and training for properly completing its mission. The Department did not have adequate policies and procedures for all aspects of FRU. For example, FRU lacked clear policies relating to mountain bike training requirements. Although SOP USB-000-73 requires that employees attend and successfully complete a Department-
sanctioned or recognized police mountain bike training program, that SOP does not specify the programs that meet the Department requirements.

The Department did not have adequate policies and procedures for securing ballistic helmets and vests strategically stored around the Capitol Complex. A total of 12 ballistic vests and 12 ballistic helmets were stolen by rioters on January 6, 2021. According to PoliceNet, FRU “is the first line of defense and is usually the Unit that the public sees on television and newspaper coverage of the Capitol.” A Department official stated on January 6, 2021, that FRU was tasked with their regular duties and was not provided with any precautionary information. Some of FRU’s ballistic vests and helmets were staged in storage cases next to standing posts. After FRU officers retreated as a result of the violent rioters, those ballistic vests and helmets were stolen. FRU does not have proper storage for their ballistic vests and helmets at certain FRU posts.

FRU lacked clear policies related to inspection logs for remote locking devices. Although SOP AC-000-04 requires that remote locking devices are inspected on a semi-annual basis by the Security Services Bureau to include battery replacement, that SOP does not require the process is documented. As such, the Department was unable to provide support that the remote locking devices had been inspected on a semi-annual basis.

The Department lacked policies and procedures defining a requirement that FRU officers be certified with the use of the M4 rifle. As of May 2021, officers assigned to FRU were not required to be M4 certified. A Department official stated, however, that the M4 rifle is the unit’s primary long gun and used by FRU officers at certain posts and staged at strategic locations. Additionally, the official stated that all FRU officers should be required to be M4 certified because of its use in daily FRU operations.

GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Documentation of Responsibilities through Policies, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, state:
• Only when the right personnel for the job are on board and are provided the right training, tools, structure, incentives, and responsibilities is operational success possible.

FRU did not have the proper resources to complete its mission. During interviews with Department officials, concerns were expressed about FRU’s equipment, training, and physical access management. Many of the concerns were highlighted during the events of January 6, 2021. Furthermore, a Department official stated that manpower is an issue because of the schedule of working 6 days a week, 12 hours a day and is affecting retention and morale.

FRU officers were not equipped with adequate less lethal weapons such as the PepperBall and Sting-Ball weapon systems. Department officials expressed concerns about FRU’s less lethal capabilities. As of May 2021, FRU officers were equipped with the Department’s standard oleoresin capsicum spray and collapsible baton as their less lethal options. According to an FRU official, the Department’s standard less lethal weapons provided to FRU officers on January 6, 2021, was “inadequate.” As previously stated, FRU officers are typically stationed on the outer perimeter of the Capitol where the general public makes first contact. A Department Official stated that “less lethal weapons are just as important as long guns” because of their ability to incapacitate a person or a group of people without directly escalating to lethal means. Those types of weapons would be effective assisting officers when confronting violent crowds similar to the ones encountered during the events of January 6, 2021, or mentally ill individuals. The official specifically commended the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers who provided assistance to the USCP officers utilizing “heavier less than lethal weapons” and suggested the FRU Officers be trained and provided with more effective less than lethal weapons.

FRU did not have an adequate number of bicycles in its unit. FRU relies on motorcycles, automobiles, and mountain bicycles to patrol their assigned area. A Department official stated mountain bikes are critical to patrolling their area of responsibility due to their low cost and ability to quickly respond to situations especially evident during January 6, 2021, when
MPD’s bicycle unit was able to rapidly respond to USCP’s call for assistance. As of May 2021, FRU had 20 mountain bikes available for approximately 160 FRU officers.

FRU lacked advanced medical and tactical training. On January 6, 2021, many officers were affected by chemical irritants dispatched from the crowd. Those officers did not have a proper decontamination site within reach and ended up using water bottles or bathroom sinks to decontaminate. A Department official stated that USCP relies on the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department for medical assistance during events. The issue with utilizing the District of Columbia services is response time and the probability some requests for the District to pre-stage their medical personnel for events may be rejected. Furthermore, the Department official suggested that FRU members train and equip a number of its officers to the same standard as an Emergency Medical Technician. Implementing that suggestion would ensure FRU officers are provided with immediate access to emergency medical care and supplies in any future violent events.

A Department official stated FRU officers are the Capitol’s “first line of defense” but the unit does not tactically train as a team, which would help mitigate issues such as crossfire and officer tactical movement. Because of the range for projectiles when fired by the M4 rifle, the danger to both police officers and innocent civilians is increased by the use of such weapons. And because of the positioning of FRU posts, a high probability exists that those officers may be the first to encounter an active shooter situation. Other than initial M4 long gun and required in-service training, which includes individual officer weapons qualifications, FRU members do not receive additional unit tactical training with their M4 rifles.

The Department did not have adequate access to the Capitol’s physical security infrastructure. Facilities staff members associated with the Architect of the Capitol have the responsibility to secure doors and elevators. FRU officers must contact those individuals to fulfill any requests for access, such as responding to a notification from an alarm system. FRU officers located in the Capitol Subway system during the physical breach of the Capitol Building complex on January 6, 2021, were responsible for securing the area as a last line of defense against rioters. A Department official stated officers were unable to unlock and lock all of the
doors or elevators and it was an issue during the events of January 6, 2021, where officers ended up resorting to using furniture to disable elevators surrounding the Capitol Subway system.

In conclusion, the Department is comprised of extraordinary men and women who are dedicated to protecting our democracy, putting their own lives in harm’s way in order for Congress to exercise their Constitutional duties in a safe and open manner. It is our duty to honor those officers who have given their lives but also ensuring the safety of all those working and visiting the Capitol Complex by making hard changes within the Department. Some of these changes may include a complete restructuring of the Capitol Police away from a Police Department to being more align with a Protective Agency. This new structure may have a Director of the Capitol Hill Protective Agency in command of the overall security of the Capitol Complex with a Chief of Police in command of the day-to-day Police Operations. Such a command structure would ensure a level of accountability and transparency of the overall security of the Capitol Complex.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be very happy to answer any questions the Committee may have at this time.