

**Updated Formal Statement of J. Thomas Manger,
Chief, U.S. Capitol Police**

before the

Committee On Rules and Administration

of the

United States Senate

January 5, 2022

HEARING:

Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack:

A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6.

Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Member Blunt, distinguished Members of the Committee, I am J. Thomas Manger, Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP). Thank you for providing me the opportunity to share the significant improvements we have made following the events of January 6, 2021, and the many ways the brave men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police serve our country every day.

Since taking on the responsibility of leading the men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police, I have watched them work tirelessly to fulfill their mission of protecting the U.S. Capitol, the Members of Congress, the legislative process, and everyone who visits the Capitol on a daily basis. It is a unique mission filled with challenges that the general public does not always fully grasp or appreciate. Unlike agencies such as the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA and other buildings, the USCP safeguards a public institution that, but for the restrictions of COVID-19, is regularly open to the public, who can just walk in off the street. The work of my officers makes it possible for Members to serve their constituents, and to engage in their legislative functions in a safe and secure environment.

On January 6, my officers prevailed in that mission. Confronted with a violent mob and vastly outnumbered, they displayed resilience, fortitude, and unimaginable bravery. Together with our federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, they fought under conditions that, in my four decades of law enforcement, I have never witnessed. Their eyes inflamed by repeated shots of pepper and bear spray, their bodies assaulted and beaten with bricks, flag poles, rebar, pipes, bats, sticks, Tasers, among other weapons, they fought *for over four hours*. Fighting hand-to-hand, using ingenuity and displaying incredible grit, they did not give up. Congress was able to do its job and *not one* Member, or staff, was physically harmed.

Sadly, I cannot say the same for the U.S. Capitol Police. Many officers suffered injuries, and in the wake of the attack we lost Officers Brian Sicknick and Howard Liebengood—who left behind a partner, a wife, children, parents, sisters, and brothers. On the heels of their deaths we also lost Officer William Evans. Our law enforcement colleagues at the Metropolitan Police Department also suffered loss and injuries in the attack. The physical injuries suffered that day may heal, but the emotional and psychological trauma inflicted will not soon disappear.

And yet, those officers that were able, returned to their jobs the very next day. That's resilience. That's dedication. That's commitment. They did their job on January 6 and from the moment I took my oath of office in July, it became my responsibility to do everything I can to give them all the support and resources they need.

January 6 exposed critical deficiencies with operational planning, intelligence, staffing, and equipment. I recognize those issues have to be addressed, and that is what we are doing. My executive leadership team and I are focused on the transformational change needed to make improvements in those areas. We thank the Committee for its support and guidance during this process, particularly its support for the Capitol Police Emergency Assistance Act.

The Capitol Police has been thoroughly—and understandably—scrutinized. We are the subject of investigations by your committee, the Office of the Inspector General for the Capitol Police, the Government Accountability Office, the January 6th Select Committee, and other entities. Many recommendations for reform have been issued.

I am pleased to report that we have addressed a significant portion of the many recommendations issued to the Department. Indeed, of the 103 recommendations issued by the Inspector General, we have implemented and/or addressed over 90 of them. However, I recognize that more work still remains to be done.

I read the joint Staff Report issued by your committee and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, in particular, the five recommendations directed to the U.S. Capitol Police. I can tell you with full confidence that the Department has implemented—or is in the process of implementing—each and every one of them.

Understanding the time constraints imposed on my live testimony before the Committee, I am submitting this Formal Statement for inclusion in the permanent hearing record.

Overview of Post-January 6 Improvements:

Let me start with a high level view of our post-January 6 improvements, which began on January 7. Indeed, on that day, the U.S. Capitol Police embarked on a transformational mission. I think it is safe to say that there is no part of the Department that escaped our review. This painstaking but critical process—which is ongoing-- yielded tremendous benefits and allowed us to address the many challenges the Department faced during the January 6 attack. In less than a year, we developed, and in many instances implemented, significant strategic, tactical, and operational improvements to *every* USCP Bureau. Our improvements number in the hundreds, and they include:

- improvements to the way the U.S. Capitol Police gathers, analyzes, uses, shares, and disseminates intelligence;
- improvements to our Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) through state-of-art training, new equipment, increased staffing, and increased command and control capabilities;
- recruitment of an expert in National Special Security Events to maximize intelligence, improve communications and coordination, and effectively allocate assets for large and high-profile events;
- participation in large-scale joint exercises, both internally and with federal law enforcement partners;
- routine in-person briefings for uniformed officers at roll calls prior to large and high-profile events;
- development of a Critical Incident Response Plan to obtain immediate and extensive assistance from partner agencies—we employed this on September 18;
- distribution of cell phones to all officers to improve communications;
- improved and expanded training sessions for recruits, officers, and supervisors;
- expanded wellness and health-related services to address physical and mental injuries and provide resiliency skills department-wide;
- new recruitment and retention initiatives to strengthen and increase our work force; and
- an enhanced public information office to improve the speed and accuracy of information disseminated to the general public and the media.

While this is a 30,000 foot overview of the reforms taking place within the U.S. Capitol Police, I believe that it provides a better context of the sheer magnitude of the improvements we have made to date.

Committee Recommendations:

I will now turn to the five specific recommendations in the Committee's Staff Report that are directed to the U.S. Capitol Police. I have taken the liberty of summarizing them as follows:

- 1) the need for training, equipment, and sufficient personnel;
- 2) department-wide operational planning for special events;
- 3) establishment of the CDU as a formal, permanent component of the Capitol Police;
- 4) consolidation of all Capitol Police intelligence units into a centralized Intelligence Bureau with adequately staffed and trained analysts; and
- 5) update the Incident Command System Directive to enhance communication and coordination.

I will address each recommendation in turn.

1. ***Ensure USCP has sufficient civilian and sworn personnel, with training and equipment, in the roles necessary to fulfill its mission.***

No law enforcement agency can be effective if its officers are unprepared. Preparation cannot be achieved without training. Thus, training is a top priority for the Department.

In the months following January 6, we embarked on a concerted effort to dramatically improve our officer training at every level and rank. We are taking a comprehensive approach to enhancing physical, in-service, and entry-level training, with a particular focus on the CDU, our front line officers. Although COVID-19 has delayed our timelines, we have nevertheless accomplished a great deal, including:

- increased staffing at the Department's Training Services Bureau;
- mandatory training for armor up, shelter-in-place, and lock down drills, for both House and Senate chambers;
- tactical positioning training for Uniformed Services Bureau officers;
- purchase of state-of-the-art, 360° VirTra police simulator training;
- participation in daily truck interdiction and monitoring exercises;
- engagement in joint exercise maneuvers with the CDU, SWAT team, and the D.C. National Guard; and
- increased number of recruit officer training classes.

We continue to have a need for additional training staff, as well as a larger training facility that could better accommodate the USCP's size and mission. These needs are included in our upcoming budget requests.

Of course, officers cannot effectively do their jobs without the proper equipment. Notwithstanding COVID-related supply chain delays, our efforts in the distribution and upgrading of equipment are particularly robust. Guided by the best practices of other federal law enforcement agencies and our own internal review, the USCP has ordered, and Capitol Police officers will be provided, among other things:

- new hard riot gear, including ballistic helmets;
- high-impact and splash droplet eye protection;
- fire retardant suits;
- respirators with voice protection;
- impact protective gloves;
- portable decontamination kits; and
- expanded oxygen supply kits;

We have increased our equipment orders to include:

- new shields—of various sizes--which will be stored in strategic locations throughout the Capitol Grounds;
- three additional Long Range Acoustical Devices;
- single- and multi-shot 40 MM launchers;
- a dedicated response vehicle;
- Tasers, and
- FN303 and pepper ball systems.

On a parallel track, we improved, and where necessary developed, equipment inventory tracking and storage processes, as well as expanded our equipment storage facilities. Equipment deployment strategies have also been approved. We are receiving equipment on a staggered basis, but hope to have our new inventory in place in approximately eight weeks.

2. Require a Department-wide operational plan for special events.

The Committee's second recommendation calls for the U.S. Capitol Police to develop Department-wide operational plans for special events. We took a significant step in that direction when we hired a former Secret Service official with extensive experience in major event and National Special Security Event planning to help oversee a new department-wide operational planning process. We now take a multi-phased approach to the event planning process, with a focus on information gathering, intelligence, asset determination, internal coordination, and execution. We created the Department's first Critical Incident Response Plan to formalize assistance requests from partner agencies. We continue to work on developing our own Special Event Assessment Rating – or SEAR—similar to the system employed by DHS, to establish a scale for resource planning.

All of these efforts undergird our progress on operational coordination and management, which includes the creation of Incident Action Plans (IAPs) for all large and high-profile events. This has been a game-changer. IAPs are now disseminated Department-wide in advance of all large and high-profile events, and serve as a comprehensive blue print for intelligence, operational, command, and communications plans, and include media, logistics, and deployment components as well. The Department now also engages in inter-agency coordination calls before all large and high-profile events, pre- and post-event officer briefings and readouts, resource realignments, the dissemination of use-of-force and other relevant bulletins, after-action reports, and other measures designed to improve overall coordination and efficiency.

3. ***Establish the Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) as a formal, permanent component of USCP and ensure that its officers are properly trained and equipped.***

We are focusing a great deal of our efforts on our front-line officers—the CDU—and for good reason. They are our bulwark. And many of the improvements already mentioned are directed to our CDU teams. We have taken significant steps to strengthen their effectiveness and increase officer protection. From providing dozens of training classes—with both state and federal agencies—to conducting table top exercises and refresher courses for officers and officials, we have made great strides. Keeping our officers safe is my paramount objective.

Recognizing the strategic and tactical importance of our CDU officers, we want to elevate their status and incentivize them to remain in the unit. To that end, we intend to create eight hard platoons staffed by officers assigned to the House, Senate, and Library posts. Each of these platoons will be permanent units whose members—officers as well as commanders-- stay together. This internal integration will build rapport, consistency, camaraderie, and the strong commitment needed for these first responders to do their jobs effectively. We will provide them with training modeled after the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Park Police, and other agencies with needs similar to our own who have had success with this model.

I recognize the Committee is recommending that the CDU be established as a permanent component of the Department. I do not believe that, at this time, doing so is the best use of our staffing and resources. Even if the CDU was set up as an independent unit, we would still need to assign those officers collateral duties so they would not remain idle for any significant period of time. Given our current vacancies, budget, and the mission needs of other Department components, this is something we cannot accomplish in the near term.

We have, however, fortified the CDU by the establishment of a new unit of which I am particularly proud—the Bike Response Team. We now deploy 100 trained and certified officers, as well as eight trained and certified officials, to complement CDU operations. The entire Bike Response Team was stood up and launched for action in four months.

Informed by the weapons used on January 6, we also conducted a review and upgrade of all CDU equipment. To that end, and in addition to the equipment I previously mentioned, we ordered (and in many instances already issued) eye protectors, portable decontamination kits, shot launchers, and other protective equipment. We also developed a quarterly inventory process and internal controls for munitions. We replaced all damaged and/or expired shields, and developed tactical plans to store additional equipment throughout strategic locations on the Capitol complex.

4. ***Consolidate and elevate all USCP intelligence units into an Intelligence Bureau led by a civilian; ensure the Bureau is adequately staffed and trained; and develop policies to disseminate intelligence to leadership and rank-and-file officers effectively.***

As I noted at the outset, our improvements touch every component of the U.S. Capitol Police, but few changes are as dramatic as the ones we have made to the way we gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.

I would first like to step back and highlight an important point: our improvements to the Department's lead intelligence component—the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD)—are not the sole result of the events of January 6th. Prior to that date, the Department recognized that IICD's decentralized structure had created informational silos, a reality that hampered its intelligence role and mission. The Department was aware that it needed to expand into a centralized bureau with over-arching responsibility for the intelligence function. Thus, our current efforts build upon a pre-existing foundation of change. This continuous focus has yielded significant improvements, including:

- a nation-wide search for a permanent intelligence director—the Department is in the final stages of the process and expects to make a selection in the coming weeks;
- the development of a USCP intelligence product that is now shared with the Intelligence Community;
- the issuance of daily intelligence report distributed to *all* officers;
- daily intelligence briefing for Department leadership;
- quarterly in-person intelligence briefings at roll calls;
- bi-weekly classified intelligence briefings;
- the sharing of intelligence assessments with external law enforcement partners;
- the coordination and lead role in calls with intelligence partners in advance of large and/or high-profile events;
- the revision of all intelligence SOPs, a process that is currently underway;
- the development of new position descriptions for all Intelligence Research Specialists that align with OPM position descriptions;
- the realignment of Task Force officers to enhance intelligence sharing and dissemination; and
- receipt of authorization for increasing staffing.

The Department will continue to be forward-looking and proactive in its efforts to create a proven and reliable intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination program.

5. *Update its Incident Command Systems Directive to address how Incident Commanders are to communicate priorities, strategies, tactics, and threat assessment to front-line officers prior to and during an incident and ensure that the Directive is followed.*

As a general proposition, I do not disagree with the Committee’s conclusion that the Department’s Incident Command System (ICS) did not function as it should on January 6, leaving front-line officers without key information as events unfolded. Thus, we formalized the process for designating incident commanders for large and high-profile events, and developed contingency plans that anticipate and account for gaps in commander communications with officers.

I am confident that the development and implementation of Incident Action Plans before every large or high-profile event will go a long way towards ensuring that we are never again confronted with another January 6. Indeed, IAPs are designed to align to the ICS. Thus, we have revised and improved our internal planning process to include increased involvement by all affected divisions to ensure all commanders are prepared for any event. We have incorporated enhanced contingency plans into our overall planning process to account for unforeseen circumstances. We have implemented and mandated standardized after-action-reports that solicit input from all ranks to provide “lessons learned” to inform future event planning.

The Department has also made significant inroads into fortifying one of the critical pillars of event planning—inter-agency coordination. On this front, the Department has made many advancements, including:

- development of the first Critical Incident Response Plan to formalize the receipt of assistance from partner agencies;
- execution of specific memoranda of understanding to facilitate inter-agency coordination and assistance;
- implementation of a radio patch with external partner agencies from the National Capital Region (NCR) to improve inter-operability; and
- increased number of published reports for events occurring outside the NCR.

Conclusion

As I mentioned at the outset, the Department has accomplished a great deal in the past year. I am extremely proud of the resilience, commitment, and dedication of all those, civilian and sworn, in the Department—from my executive leadership team, to first-line supervisors, to every rank-and-file officer. I am confident that the U.S. Capitol Police is a stronger, better prepared law enforcement agency. However, we cannot afford to be complacent. I have asked a lot of the entire Department and will continue to press for more. The safety and security of the U.S. Capitol, the Congress, and the legislative process remain the top priorities.

The U.S. Capitol Police are appreciative of the support from the Capitol Police Board as well as the Oversight Committees. We fully understand the need to restore confidence in our ability to fulfill our mission each day, no matter the circumstances. The men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police proved their mettle on January 6. I take full responsibility for restoring confidence in the leadership of the Department. We have accomplished a great deal with more work to be done.