Chairwoman Klobuchar, Chairman Steil, Ranking Member Fischer, Ranking Member Morelle and Members of the Committees, thank you for the opportunity to provide both Committees with an overview of the comprehensive security improvements we have implemented, our collaboration with the Capitol Police Board (Board) to implement those changes and increase transparency, as well as a roadmap of the work that still lies ahead. The Department greatly appreciates the Committees’ continued support of the women and men of the U.S. Capitol Police, who courageously carry out their duties of protecting the Members of Congress, staff, visitors, the Capitol Complex, and the legislative process each and every day. Congress’ support has been invaluable as we continue to meet the dramatic workload increases in an increasingly volatile threat environment. The Department also appreciates the guidance and support provided by the Board in assisting the Department’s resolution of the various post-January 6 recommendations as the Department transitions to a more protective model of policing.

The United States Capitol Police is unique among federal law enforcement agencies. We patrol a campus that is completely open. The public has a constitutional right to visit, protest, and petition their government on Capitol Grounds. Our officers work 24/7 to keep you safe, whether here on Capitol Hill, or when you travel to your home states and districts. We staff the doors, corridors, plazas, garages, and street corners—in sum, every square foot of the Capitol Grounds. Prior to the pandemic, the Capitol was visited every year by an estimated seven to ten million people from around the world. Now that the campus is reopened, the Department is once again managing this increased level of visitor activity—all within the context of evolving and increasing threats against Members of Congress and their families, and the need to provide protection nation-wide.

In the last three years, the Department confronted two transformative events: the coronavirus pandemic and January 6. These events directly impacted the Capitol community, particularly the men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police, who responded to each crisis with courage and resilience, adjusting and pivoting when needed, and within extremely compressed timelines.

The pandemic represented a historic and unprecedented event that required the USCP to quickly recalibrate and move to an entirely new operational and administrative model. While House and Senate office buildings were closed to the public, the work of the Congress had to proceed unimpeded. Under these circumstances, the men and woman of the USCP performed critical job functions. The Department had to manage delayed recruitment efforts due to the closure of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), a move that affected the
hiring and deployment of new sworn officers--essentially bringing our sworn hiring to a halt. Low officer morale, and the public’s declining confidence in law enforcement, put a further strain on the organization. Hiring within law enforcement remains challenging in the post-pandemic environment, not just for the Department but nation-wide, as men and women consider occupations that are less stressful, certainly less dangerous and provide a better work-life balance.

Since March 1, 2020, approximately 462 officers have left the Department, of which 390 left after January 6, 2021. After FLETC reopened, the Department committed to onboarding approximately 288 officers a year to get ahead of attrition, closing the delta between the Department’s sworn FTE cap and the actual number of sworn officers. The Department determined this was necessary to address the USCP’s expanding mission requirements and to address the attrition.

To date, the Department, with the support of Congress, has been successful in getting ahead of attrition, bringing on 549 officers since March of 2020. The current number of sworn employees on the Department is 2,011 officers, which includes recruits at USCP Academy and FLETC. While still below the Department’s authorized level of 2126 sworn officers, it has allowed us to reopen the campus and provide critical training for our officers, such as Civil Disturbance, virtual scenario training, and active shooter training within Congressional buildings.

In consultation with the Board, through Board Orders and the approval of the Department’s budget submission, and the support of Congress, the Department has implemented a number of strategies to retain officers and civilian employees, such as bolstering salaries to be more competitive with competing agencies, offering retention bonuses, the student loan repayment program, and specialty pay to attract and retain officers. I would like to thank the Board and Congress for its assistance and support.

January 6 exposed weaknesses within the organization. The more than a dozen after-action reviews and resulting recommendations shifted the Department’s priorities and accelerated the timeline for resolving the findings of those recommendations, thus beginning the Department’s transformation. These audit and oversight reviews were pivotal. The Department dedicated a significant amount of time and resources to the implementation of recommendations issued by the various stakeholders and oversight entities, including the USCP Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the Senate Homeland Security Committee, the Government Accountability Office, and other third party reviewers. The OIG alone issued 103 recommendations in the post-January 6 flash reports.

In order to assist the Department in addressing the various recommendations, the Board revitalized the Inspector General Working Group. The working group, comprised of representatives from the Department and the Board, is working productively to develop strategies for closure of open recommendations, collaboratively identifying and overcoming obstacles that arise along the way. The USCP Inspector General is an important member of the working group. The Inspector General provides updates on the Department’s progress, highlighting issues or target areas that are of particular importance. This involvement by the
 Inspector General has been invaluable in the Department’s efforts to address and complete all OIG recommendations.

As part of a move towards increasing transparency while safeguarding sensitive security information, the IG working group has developed a process to review and redact, if necessary, OIG reports slated for publication. This review is designed to provide the public with important information regarding the work of the USCP, with the recognition that security or sensitive information that may affect the safety and security of Members of Congress and the Capitol complex is not widely disseminated. USCP subject matter experts conduct a thorough review of these reports, which are then submitted to the working group and the Board for further review and approval before posting on the OIG’s website.

Thanks to the Department’s sustained efforts, the support of the Capitol Police Board, and the Congress, the vast majority of recommendations issued have been addressed, and those that remain are on a glide path to completion. Of the 103 recommendations made by the OIG, 89 recommendations have been closed, leaving only 14 open.

The Department’s improvements extend beyond those mentioned above. Other significant enhancements include increasing staffing levels for the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division. This has enabled the USCP to stand up an Intelligence Bureau capable of collecting, analyzing, sharing, operationalizing, and disseminating intelligence; the implementation of additional wellness programs and services, including the onboarding of trauma-informed employee assistance counselors and wellness specialists; procuring and distributing additional civil disturbance equipment to our sworn officers and insuring these officers have received updated CDU training; obtaining funding for our Dignitary Protection Division to travel and protect Members of Congress here and around the country; updating Department technology to enhance investigative capabilities; installing physical barriers at vulnerable vehicular access points on Capitol Grounds; re-engineered training capabilities to meet recruit officer, in-service, physical skills, professional and leadership develop needs and requirements; and we have adopted industry best practices with the use of virtual scenario training, to include active shooter training in the very building we need to protect. I would particularly like to thank the Committees and the Board for their support of our active shooter training. The Department is also participating in the Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement program. Modeled on a train-the-trainer approach, the program’s aim is to create a culture of peer intervention and de-escalation. The Department’s training efforts in this area are well underway and we expect to train the entire workforce on the ABLE program within the next 12 months.

Unlike other law enforcement agencies, we have been asked in the last two years to develop and implement transformational structural and strategic changes within extremely accelerated time lines, while simultaneously maintaining the staffing and resources needed to carry out the Department’s daily core mission. And the effort and manpower resource allocation that undergirds these efforts are often not sufficiently recognized or understood. The opening of doors throughout the Congressional Campus exemplifies this challenge. Adequately staffing a campus door requires 3 to 4 officers per shift to ensure a proper level of security (3 shifts per day, often 5-6 days per week.) Long lines are not only an inconvenience to Members, staff, and
visitors, they represent a security risk that, in these increasingly volatile times, the Department must address. While the “big picture” reforms are significant and important, staffing daily mission requirements are vital. We engage in a “no fail” mission every day. Working in close collaboration with the Board, the Department implemented a plan to reopen the campus that balanced the public’s need for open access with the security of the Members, staff and visitors, and the legislative process.

While all the Department’s needs are important, I cannot overstate how great our resource needs are for the Protective Services Bureau. The sheer increase in the number of threats against Members of Congress—approximately 300% over the past 7 years—requires new and innovative techniques to identify, deter, and mitigate threats before they materialize. Over the course of the last year, the world has continuously changed, becoming more violent and uncertain. A Member of Congress was brutally assaulted, another Member was attacked on the campaign trail, the husband of the former House Speaker was critically wounded in a politically-motivated attack, and a Member’s district staff was attacked by a baseball bat wielding intruder. These events demonstrate how the Capitol Police need to transform to a more protective agency, one that concentrates on protecting Members, their families and staff throughout the country, not merely in Washington, D.C. Upcoming elections, the campaign activities that precede them, and the increasingly heated political rhetoric further heighten the prospect of future security risks and challenges that the Department needs to be prepared to meet.

One of the Department’s greatest challenges is the retention of our Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) and Investigations Division Agents. Prior to January 6, 2021, DPD was staffed with 218 agents and 15 Supervisory Special Agents. Currently, DPD has 174 fully trained agents, 38 USB reserve officers, and 12 Supervisory Special Agents.

Due to the increased threat environment, our protective responsibilities have increased, requiring additional protection details, increased coverage of CODELs and field hearings, as well as other enhancements to our current protective details. This staffing level is unsustainable for DPD. Agents are averaging nearly 50 hours of overtime a pay-period, more than double the average of uniformed officers. We are on pace again this year to receive approximately 8,000 to 9,000 threat assessment cases. Threat Assessment agents are similarly stretched to capacity. They carry an average annual case load of nearly 500 cases. Notwithstanding these crushing caseloads, our DPD and Threat Assessment agents work tirelessly and the utmost professionalism and dedication. However, this pace cannot be maintained and we must have the ability to continue our hiring efforts in this critical area.

The Department, with the Board’s assistance, are working to remedy this situation. Many of the strategies to address these challenges were included in our FY23 and FY24 budget requests. These strategies include additional positions, 1811 law enforcement status and LEAP pay, both of which would positively impact our recruitment efforts and slow attrition in our Protection Services Bureau. To address our staffing issues in the short term, we have supplemented DPD with reserve officers, and when possible, we work with other law enforcement agencies in a Member’s district for protective detail support through the Memorandum of Understanding process. We are on track to recruit rehired annuitants to fill Protective officer positions, such as DPD drivers, residential officers, and our Threats duty desk,
to ease the burden on our agents. The Capitol Police Board recently amended the pay regulations, which will facilitate hiring for positions within DPD and Investigations division thru lateral hires and rehired annuitants. This would also not have been possible without the Committees’ approval of those regulations, and for that, I thank you for your continued support.

The Department and the Board are also taking steps for increased transparency and accountability. The Department is in the final stages of implementing a FOIA-like process that will enable the public to request information from the Department. In addition, the Department is now posting arrest information on its website in a searchable format. As an ex-officio Member of the Board, my participation in stakeholder forums allow our stakeholders to be briefed by the Department and Board, with the opportunities that afford for robust dialogue and discussion. I am also available to discuss any issue with you at any time.

Working in close collaboration with the Department, the Board is also working to close all of the outstanding GAO recommendations that addressed accountability and transparency. The Board updated the Board manual of procedures to address the concerns raised by GAO and is in the process of updating the manual further to address concerns.

The Department has accomplished a great deal and reached many milestones, but much hard work lies ahead as we progress to the next phase of our shift to a more protective model of policing. Our continued collaboration with the Board, and of course the Committees, is central to furthering this objective. Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to answering your questions.