Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Member Blunt, Chairman Peters, and Ranking Member Portman. Thank you for allowing me to testify regarding the attack on the United States Capitol that occurred on January 6, 2021, during the Joint Session of Congress.

I would first like to say that the time that I spent with the United States Capitol Police was the best, most rewarding four years of my career. The United States Capitol Police has an outstanding reputation among law enforcement across the country, and for good reason. The officers and employees of the USCP work tirelessly and selflessly every day to protect the Members, staff, and visitors at the United States Capitol. I could not be prouder to have been a part of this team, especially on January 6, 2021.

I have been in law enforcement for almost 30 years, and in that time I have been involved in a number of critical incidents, and responded to a number of horrific scenes. The events on January 6, 2021, constituted the worst attack on law enforcement that I have seen in my entire career. This was an attack that we are learning was pre-planned, and involved participants from a number of states who came well equipped, coordinated, and prepared to carry out a violent insurrection at the United States Capitol. I witnessed insurgents beating police officers with fists, pipes, sticks, bats, metal barricades, and flag poles. These criminals came prepared for war. They came with weapons, chemical munitions and explosives. They came with shields, ballistic protection, and tactical gear. They came with their own radio system to coordinate the attack, as well as climbing gear and other equipment to defeat the Capitol’s security features.

The breach of the United States Capitol was not the result of poor planning or failure to contain a demonstration gone wrong. No single civilian law enforcement agency – and certainly not the USCP – is trained and equipped to repel, without significant military or other law enforcement assistance, an insurrection of thousands of armed, violent, and coordinated individuals focused on breaching a building at all costs. Without the intelligence to properly prepare, the USCP was significantly outnumbered and left to defend the Capitol against an extremely violent mob. The officers from the USCP and our partner agencies fought valiantly that day against tremendous odds. I am extremely proud of these officers for their heroic response and also for their restraint in the application of lethal force. While, tragically, there were causalities on this day, the loss of life could have been far worse if it had not been for the professionalism and restraint shown by the officers that day.

There has been much conflicting information presented by various officials and the media regarding the preparations for and actions taken at the Capitol that day, and I would like to set the record straight from my perspective. Contrary to some of the reporting, the USCP had an
effective plan in place to handle the First Amendment demonstrations and possible pockets of violence that were anticipated for January 6, based upon the available intelligence. The United States Capitol Police, just like most law enforcement agencies, is a consumer of the information provided by the intelligence community. The USCP uses this information, as well as our own information and research to develop plans for events and demonstrations. Thus, the plans that we developed for the Joint Session of Congress and the associated demonstrations expected that day were based upon all of the available information and intelligence that we had prior to the event, as well as the experience we had handling other similar events.

After the election on November 3, 2020, there were other large protests planned by pro-Trump supporters: one on November 14 (MAGA I) and one on December 12 (MAGA II), both of which were located at the Supreme Court building and adjacent Capitol grounds, and involved thousands of people. We handled both of those events successfully, utilizing an action plan that was based on intelligence assessments developed by us and our partner agencies. The USCP Intelligence and Inter-Agency Coordination Division (IICD) prepared intelligence assessments for both of the MAGA I and MAGA II events that indicated that various extremist groups were expected to attend the events and that there was a likelihood of violence. Based on the intelligence, the action plan included: coordination with our law enforcement partners, development of a staffing and Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) plan, coordination with the Congressional community, enhanced protective actions for Members of Congress, and the deployment of physical crowd management devices that consisted of steel crowd control barriers. During those two protests, there was a limited amount of violence and/or injuries to officers, and a limited number of arrests.

As we prepared for the third protest, we understood that the focus of the protests would be the Capitol itself, and not the Supreme Court as in the previous two demonstrations, and that we could expect the crowd to be somewhat different in size and risk. As is standard practice, our IICD hosted a number of internal briefings and published intelligence assessments of the event, the most recent being published on January 3, 2021, three days before the event. The IICD reports include input from internal U.S. Capitol Police intelligence officials, such as our Director of Intelligence John Donahue, who is an expert in right-wing extremism, as well as information provided by our partner agencies such as the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police.

As previously mentioned, the IICD intelligence assessment indicated that the January 6th protests/rallies were “expected to be similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in November and December 2020, which drew tens of thousands of participants.” The assessment indicated that members of the Proud Boys, white supremacist groups, Antifa, and other extremist groups were expected to participate in the January 6th event and that they may be inclined to become violent. This was very similar to the intelligence assessment of the December 12, 2020, MAGA II event. In addition, on Monday, January 4, 2021, the USCP IICD published the Daily Intelligence Report which provided an assessment of all of the groups expected to demonstrate on January 6, 2021. The IICD Daily Intelligence Report assessed “the level of probability of acts
of civil disobedience/arrests occurring based on current intelligence information,” as “Remote” to “Improbable” for all of the groups expected to demonstrate on Wednesday, January 6, 2021. In addition, the Daily Intelligence report indicated that “The Secretary of Homeland Security has not issued an elevated or imminent alert at this time....”

At no time during the previous MAGA I or MAGA II events did the crowd attempt to storm or attack the Supreme Court building, or the adjacent Capitol building, and based upon all available intelligence, nothing of that sort was expected to happen on January 6. The USCP has successfully managed numerous large-scale protests where demonstrators have conducted illegal (based on location) and contentious demonstrations on the Capitol grounds and even on its steps. Based upon our experience with the prior post-election demonstrations, our ongoing intelligence assessment and briefings, and the input from our law enforcement partners over the course of many weeks, we developed and implemented a security plan for the January 6 Joint Session of Congress. The USCP implemented a number of enhancements to our planning for January 6, 2021, based on the intelligence that we had.

In preparation for the Joint Session of Congress, I directed that the Department be placed into an “all hands on deck” status, meaning every available sworn employee with police powers would be working. We activated the largest number of CDU platoons possible while still supporting the Joint Session of Congress. This allowed for the activation of approximately seven CDU platoons (approximately 250 officers), with approximately four platoons being available in “hard” gear -- helmets, protective clothing, and shields. While limited by budgetary and training restraints imposed on USCP, the planned number of CDU officers had always sufficed for large demonstrations on Capitol Hill prior to January 6th. In addition, we activated civilian support for January 6 to include enhanced access to the property management division, in the event officers needed replacement uniforms or equipment, and vehicle services.

During my time as the Chief, I had directed enhancements to the protective equipment being issued to our sworn employees. In 2020, I directed the procurement of riot helmets for all of the sworn members of the Department. Prior to this time, riot helmets were only issued to members assigned to the Department’s Civil Disturbance Units (CD). The delivery of the helmets from the manufacturer had been delayed over the past several months due to the effects of COVID-19, but we had been pushing for delivery by the Inauguration. As helmets became available, we pushed for their expedited delivery due to the upcoming demonstration and approximately 104 of the helmets were delivered on Monday, January 4. We also developed contingency plans in the event that we had armed individuals in the crowd. In addition, we coordinated coverage for the event with the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Service. I directed that additional Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) kits be available in the field if needed. TCCC is specialized training and equipment that prepares officers in the field to implement emergency life-saving care to stop victims from bleeding to death as the result of a gunshot wound or injury. During my time with the USCP, I have authorized officers to carry the TCCC kits and for all new recruits to be trained in TCCC emergency medical care.
On January 2, 2021, I contacted MPD Chief Robert Contee to discuss support if necessary for January 6th. On the morning of January 6th, MPD Assistant Chief Jeffery Carroll and I exchanged information regarding our designated CDU Incident Command (IC). This was done in an effort to facilitate immediate command and control of assets if requested. As a result of this advanced coordination, MPD had pre-staged significant CDU resources on the north side of the Capitol.

Well before the planned demonstration, I worked with USCP Assistant Chief Thomas, Assistant Chief Pittman, and her Security Services Bureau to develop an expanded perimeter barrier plan. The expanded perimeter was based on the concern for First Amendment activity focused on the Capitol and the large number of people expected. Both the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms approved the expanded perimeter plan. It was the heightened tension related to the certification of the vote, and the expanded perimeter that made me believe that National Guard assistance might be necessary.

In support of Member security, we also worked with the local airport authorities to enhance coverage at the airports utilizing both local law enforcement and the USCP. We also worked with the Department of Transportation to enhance awareness of Members utilizing commercial air carriers. In addition, we developed contingency plans, in coordination with the Sergeants at Arms, to assist Members off-campus, who either experience emergency situations or difficulty reaching the Capitol complex.

On Monday, January 4, I approached the two Sergeants at Arms to request the assistance of the National Guard, as I had no authority to do so without an Emergency Declaration by the Capitol Police Board (CPB). My regular interactions with the CPB, outside of our monthly meetings regarding law enforcement matters, were conducted with the House and Senate Sergeant at Arms, the two members of the CPB who have law enforcement experience. I first spoke with the House Sergeant at Arms to request the National Guard. Mr. Irving stated that he was concerned about the “optics” of having National Guard present and didn’t feel that the intelligence supported it. He referred me to the Senate Sergeant at Arms (who is currently the Chair of the CPB) to get his thoughts on the request. I then spoke to Mr. Stenger and again requested the National Guard. Instead of approving the use of the National Guard, however, Mr. Stenger suggested I ask them how quickly we could get support if needed and to “lean forward” in case we had to request assistance on January 6.

At Mr. Stenger’s direction, I called General William Walker, commanding officer of the D.C. National Guard. I advised that I had not received CPB approval, but wanted to know how many National Guard he could provide and how fast could he provide them if they were needed on Capitol Hill on January 6. He advised that he could repurpose nearby National Guard and have them to me fairly quickly, once approved. I asked General Walker to be prepared in the event that we requested them.
On Tuesday, January 5, I hosted a virtual meeting with my Executive Team, all three principals of the Capitol Police Board, and a dozen of the top law enforcement and military officials from D.C., including the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, and the National Guard. This meeting focused on both the January 6 event, and the upcoming Presidential Inauguration on January 20. During the meeting, no entity, including the FBI, provided any intelligence indicating that there would be a coordinated violent attack on the United States Capitol by thousands of well-equipped armed insurrectionists. At no time did the Department of Homeland Security issue a threat advisory bulletin in reference to violent extremists planning a coordinated, violent attack on the U.S. Capitol. It should also be noted that the U.S. Secret Service planned to and did escort the Vice President of the United States to the Capitol on January 6, which it obviously would not have done if it believed there to be a threat of a violent insurrection at the Capitol building and on its grounds.

In the days leading up to January 6, we briefed a number of Members of Congress who had requested an advance briefing on our security plan and the permitted demonstration activity scheduled for January 6, 2021. The members that were briefed in advance include: Chairman Blunt, Chairperson Lofgren, Chairman Ryan, and Representative Waters. We informed these members of the expectation of protests, current permitted First Amendment activity on Capitol grounds, our response planning efforts and established perimeter, as well as enhanced Member security initiatives such as increased checks on residences and the ability of the USCP to respond off Capitol grounds to assist Members safely getting to the Capitol if needed. Contrary to some allegations made to the media, I did not at any time misrepresent facts to Members. I provided an accurate reporting of our intelligence and threat assessment at the time. In addition, on January 5, 2021, at 11:48 a.m., I sent an email to the four committees with oversight of the USCP providing them with an overview of the expected events for January 5 and 6, and our coordination with the House and Senate Sergeant at Arms.

Lastly, in preparation for the event I sent an email to the USCP Assistant Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs on the evening of Tuesday, January 5, directing them to ensure that all roll calls and officers were fully briefed on what to expect during their shifts -- a long day, large groups, and clashes that could possibly include violence.

On Wednesday, January 6, at approximately 7:15 a.m., as I was driving into work, I called MPD Inspector Robert Glover to inquire about the crowds he was seeing for the event, which was beginning at the Ellipse. Inspector Glover stated that there were already lines to get into the event, but that the crowd was compliant and he did not observe any concerning issues. I then checked in at the USCP Command Center where I would be for the event. I arrived at the Command Center, where I remained to monitor the activity on the National Mall and the Ellipse. I sat at the center console with Assistant Chiefs Pittman and Thomas nearby.

We were monitoring the actions and demeanor of the crowd, which at the time did not raise any concerns, when we received word at 12:52 p.m. that a pipe bomb had been located at the Republican National Committee Headquarters, immediately adjacent to Capitol Grounds. We responded immediately to coordinate and send resources to the scene, including a number of
officers, officials, and a bomb squad. We also dispatched resources to look for other explosive devices, suspects, and vehicles. At almost the exactly same time, we observed a large group of individuals approaching the West Front of the Capitol.

When the group arrived at the perimeter, they did not act like any group of protestors I had ever seen. Unlike other heated protests, these protesters did not simply congregate to angrily voice their grievances. As soon as this group arrived at our perimeter, they immediately began to fight violently with the officers and to tear apart the steel crowd control barriers, using them to assault the officers. It was immediately clear that their primary goal was to defeat our perimeter as quickly as possible and to get past the police line. This mob was like nothing I have seen in my law enforcement career. The group consisted of thousands of well-coordinated, well-equipped violent criminals. They had weapons, chemical munitions, protective equipment, explosives, and climbing gear. A number of them were wearing radio ear pieces indicating a high level of coordination.

Given these factors, it was clear to me at 12:50 p.m. that the situation was deteriorating rapidly. I called MPD and requested assistance and they responded immediately. I also requested assistance from the U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division and other law enforcement agencies. I notified the two Sergeant at Arms by 1:09 p.m. that I urgently needed support and asked them to declare a State of Emergency and authorize the National Guard. I was advised by Mr. Irving that he needed to run it up the chain of command. I continued to follow up with Mr. Irving, who was with Mr. Stenger at the time, and he advised that he was waiting to hear back from congressional leadership, but expected authorization at any moment.

At approximately 1:50 p.m., not yet having authorization from CPB, and noting the extreme urgency of the situation, I notified General William Walker that I should have approval shortly and that we had an urgent request for the National Guard. At 2:10 p.m., I received notification from Mr. Irving that the CPB authorized me to request the National Guard. However, as explained below, I soon learned that our request would also need to be approved by the Department of Defense.

Meanwhile, at approximately 1:50 p.m., USCP resources dispatched to look for other possible explosives located another pipe bomb at the Democratic National Committee headquarters, as well as a vehicle with explosives and a weapon, all within close proximity of the Capitol Grounds. As a result of these explosive devices, extensive USCP resources were dispatched to the scenes, and two congressional office buildings had to be evacuated. I believe all of this was part of a coordinated plan related to the attack on the Capitol.

At 1:51 p.m., I activated the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Mutual Aid Agreement, requesting assistance from law enforcement agencies from the National Capital Region (NCR). As a result of this request for law enforcement assistance, we had over 1,700 officers from 18 law enforcement agencies respond to assist the USCP. I worked closely with Assistant Chief Thomas and Deputy Chief Pickett to establish resource management to account
for and deploy the officers from the responding agencies in the most effective and efficient manner.

We also established priorities for the responding officers, which included: (1) securing the perimeter and foundation of the Capitol; and (2) assisting the USCP in removing unauthorized persons from the Capitol and conducting a top to bottom sweep of the building to ensure no unauthorized persons, or hazardous devices remained in the building. These goals were implemented as quickly as was possible in order to facilitate the safe and expeditious return of the Members of Congress to complete their certification of the electoral votes.

In the Command Center, I could see that the USCP and MPD officers were fighting with all they had to protect the Capitol building. I saw officers hit with pipes, wooden sticks, flag poles, and sprayed with mace and bear spray, all while trying to defend themselves against projectiles being directed at them. The mob was violently and ruthlessly attacking law enforcement officers in an effort to breach their lines. The officers fought courageously against the violent attackers for over an hour before any individuals in the mob were able to breach the Capitol Building. This is an important point to emphasize because some media reporting has indicated that the insurgents were able to breach the building within minutes of breaking though our perimeter. This was not the case at all. The USCP and MPD battled with the violent mob for over an hour before anyone in the group was able to breach the building. In fact, at some entrances to the Capitol, such as the lower west terrace entrance, law enforcement fought with the mob for hours to prevent them from accessing the building.

As the crowd was attempting to breach the building, our Dignitary Protection Division teams prepared to evacuate congressional leadership. USCP assigned to the House and Senate Chambers, secured the two locations. As the crowds breached the building, USCP attempted to secure the hallways and prevent the mob from advancing further into the building. The USCP initiated evacuations of the two Chambers and USCP officers began to move Members of Congress to safe locations.

At approximately 2:28 p.m., I learned that in order to get authorization for National Guard support, the Pentagon needed to approve the request. I was therefore asked to participate in a conference call with Dr. Chris Rodriguez, D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency; Chief Robert Contee, Metropolitan Police; General William Walker, D.C. National Guard; and Lt. General Walter Piatt, the Director of Army Staff. During the call I again made an urgent request for immediate National Guard support. I explained that the National Guard was needed to shore up our perimeter to help secure the Capitol. Lt. General Walter Piatt stated, "I don't like the visual of the National Guard standing a line with the Capitol in the background. I would much rather relieve USCP officers from other posts so they can handle the protestors." I urgently advised that this was not an option and that I did not have officers to swap with National Guard and that I needed assistance immediately. Lt. General Piatt stated that he was preparing to brief the Secretary of the Army and that his recommendation would be not to support the request. Chief Contee then stated, "So you are denying the request from the Capitol Police." Chief Contee then asked me, "Steve, are you requesting National Guard assistance?" to which I stated,
"Yes, I need immediate assistance with National Guard at the Capitol, I do not have the option to swap out officers on check points." Lt. General Piatt then indicated that he was going to run the request up the chain of command at the Pentagon.

Almost two hours later, we had still not received authorization from the Pentagon to activate the National Guard. Mr. Stenger offered to have Senator McConnell call the Secretary of the Army to expedite the request. I agreed that this would be a good idea. I followed up approximately 20 minutes later to check on the call and express the need for leadership to call to assist in expediting the request. The first 150 members of the National Guard were not sworn in on Capitol grounds until 5:40 p.m., four and a half hours after I first requested them and three and a half hours after my request was approved by the Capitol Police Board.

By late afternoon we were able to re-establish our perimeter with the assistance of MPD and the responding law enforcement agencies. We then methodically cleared the building, establishing the security of both the building and the House and Senate chambers. At 5:36 p.m., I briefed Vice President Pence on the current security posture, after which he initiated a call with Speaker Pelosi, and I advised both that the Chambers could be safely re-occupied by 7:30 p.m. I also participated in a conference call at approximately 6:25 p.m. with Congressional leadership that included Speaker Pelosi, Senator Schumer, Senator McConnell, and Representative Clyburn. During that call I briefed the group on the current security posture of the Capitol and the ability of the House and the Senate to reconvene in their respective chambers and complete the certification of the Electoral College votes with the Vice President. Senate leadership decided to reconvene at 8:00 p.m. and House leadership at 9:00 p.m.

While the violent attack that took place was unspeakable, and those responsible for this violent insurrection should be held accountable, I am proud of the men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police, the vast majority of whom fought valiantly and risked their lives to protect Members of Congress, their staff, and the Capitol building. Because of their bravery and professionalism in the face of this attack, USCP officers prevented the mob’s actions from resulting in more bloodshed, and carried out their mission to protect the Members of Congress and the legislative process. Contrary to what others have said, the USCP did not fail. There are many heroic stories of USCP officers that day that helped to ensure the safety of the Members of Congress, including two officers who lost their lives. Democracy prevailed on January 6, 2021, in large part because of the courageous actions of the United States Capitol Police.

Although we were successful in accomplishing our mission on January 6, 2021, and no Members were injured and the legislative process was able to continue just a few hours later, Congress and the USCP must nevertheless look at this event and identify area for improvement and systems that broke down or failed. Some of the areas that need to be reviewed, which I would have reviewed had I remained in my position as Chief, include:

**Intelligence:** Since the incident on January 6, 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has indicated that the attack that occurred was pre-planned, involved participants from a number of states, who came well equipped, coordinated, and prepared to carry out a violent insurrection
of the United States Capitol. Although it appears that there were numerous participants from multiple states planning this attack, the entire intelligence community (IC) seems to have missed it. It is essential to understand that most law enforcement agencies in the United States, to include the USCP, are consumers of the intelligence provided by the IC. We rely on the information to be accurate and complete. The IC needs to reevaluate the intelligence collection requirements concerning domestic extremism and how this pertains to the law enforcement community they serve. In addition, the IC once again needs to evaluate how raw intelligence is being analyzed and translated into a finished product, or actionable intelligence for the numerous law enforcement agencies across the county.

Event planning, Directives, Policies and Procedures: The review being conducted by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the USCP, as well as the internal after-action review (AAR) being developed by the USCP, should provide an in-depth review of the adherence to past event planning practices and procedures to ensure the same level of planning was applied to the January 6, 2021, Joint Session of Congress. This should include the development and briefing of a Plan of Action approved by the Assistant Chief for Uniformed Operation. The plan established by the Capitol Division for Joint Session of Congress needs to be reviewed, as does the evacuation plan that should have been developed by DPD. The adherence to staffing mandates issued by the Chief of Police for the January 6th event needs to be evaluated. The implementation of the CDU plan developed by the Operational Support Bureau should be evaluated to determine if there were any factors that impacted their ability to use various less lethal options, affected their deployment strategy, or impacted the preparedness of the “Hard” CDU Platoons. In addition, any officials or officers who violated policies or directives, or even their oath, need to be held accountable. The USCP needs more unilateral authority to implement its security planning and the ability to call in National Guard support when needed.

Incident Command: It has been reported that during this incident, officers were not getting directions over the radio. For Command and Control of assets, the USCP works from the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS includes the designation of an Incident Commander (IC) for each geographically located event or incident. This is utilized to ensure that the officials in command of designated areas have knowledge, authority, and control of the resources assigned to their areas of responsibility. Without this system, which limits the amount of people on the radio at a given time, it would be confusing to officers who was providing direction. On January 6, 2021, there was a designated IC for the demonstrations and First Amendment activity expected on the exterior of the Capitol, and a designated IC for the Capitol Building, to include the Joint Session. Each IC had a designated radio channel to coordinate their resources. These two ICs would have been the officials responsible for ensuring that proper directions were being provided to the officers in the field. The review being conducted by the OIG and the internal AAR being conducted by the USCP, should evaluate the IC system to determine how effectively it was implemented by the Commander of the Capitol Division and if this impacted other activities, such as communications with the officers and the evacuation of the Members, staff and VIPs.
Physical Security for the Congressional Buildings and Campus: A number of USCP officers have expressed concern over what will happen to the security of the United States Capitol Grounds (USCG) when the fence comes down and the National Guard leaves. While I believe that the intelligence community has increased the intelligence aperture regarding the perpetrators of this incident, more needs to be done to address the physical security failures faced on January 6, 2021. Congress and the USCP must review current physical security standards in place for federal buildings, such as those provided by the Interagency Security Committee and their application to the Legislative Branch, as well as reviewing past GAO reports, to update the current standards being applied to congressional buildings and offices. I believe a number of steps can be taken and physical security enhancements can be implemented to significantly enhance the security of the building while maintaining the feel of an “open campus.” I would be willing to discuss this topic more in a closed session.

Training and Equipment for USCP Officers: Unlike many other law enforcement agencies, when the USCP sends officers to training, we must backfill that position with overtime, due to the fact that most officers are filling required posts. We are not able to pull officers from other locations or “stack” calls for service to make up for officers who are attending training. Currently, the USCP is allotted 24,000 hours of overtime backfill for training purposes. With a workforce of approximately 2,300 employees, this doesn’t equate to a large number of training hours per employee. The USCP is continually looking at ways to more effectively and efficiently provide training to its members. The initial Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) training requires 40 hours of initial training, and bi-annual training of 8 hours. And that is for just the basic level of CDU. Congress needs to support greater training funds that will allow a basic CDU training for all of the employees, and a specialized CDU training for the USCP employees assigned to CDU duties. The events of January 6, 2021, have demonstrated the critical need for specialized training to deal with these types of incidents.

Communications with the Congressional Community: We have heard from a number of the staff that systems established to communicate with the congressional community, such as the Joint Emergency Message Notifications System (JEMNS), the Annunciator Emergency Alerting System (AEAS), and the Public Address System may not have been as effective as expected or as necessary under these circumstances. The internal USCP review should evaluate the effectiveness of the systems on January 6, 2021, and the extent that the systems were utilized. The review should also evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of mass messaging from the Command Center.

National Guard Support for the USCP: The Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) policies and procedures need to be reviewed and updated following this incident. When a civilian law enforcement agency fulfilling a national security mission protecting the continuity of government and the legislative process is faced with an armed insurrection of thousands of violent individuals, there must be an immediate and seamless process for the military to provide assistance. In addition, the USCP needs more authority to call in the National Guard. This
incident has also revealed the need for our National Guard forces to receive specialized training in civil disobedience.

Since the events of January 6, 2021, the Speaker of the House, the Honorable Nancy Pelosi has co-sponsored legislation to issue the Congressional Gold Medal to the United States Capitol police. In her press release regarding this legislation, dated February 11, 2021, the Speaker stated, “The outstanding heroism and patriotism of our heroes deserve and demand our deepest appreciation, which is why I am honored to introduce legislation to pay tribute to the Capitol Police and other law enforcement personnel who protected the U.S. Capitol on January 6 with the Congressional Gold Medal: the highest honor that the Congress can bestow. The service of the Capitol Police force that day brings honor to our Democracy, and their accepting this Gold Medal will bring luster to this award.” In bestowing this award, Congress rightly recognized the extraordinary events and overwhelming odds that the United States Capitol Police faced that day.

I wished I had the opportunity to continue my work with the USCP. I truly appreciate every member of the Department, sworn and civilian, and I worked hard to ensure that every one of them felt that they were a valued member of the team and essential to our mission. The USCP is not like any other police agency in the country and, until January 6, 2021, many people did not truly understand the breadth of its responsibility or the role it plays in protecting our democracy. The USCP is an outstanding agency and I will always be proud of my time there. It is essential that Congress take the steps necessary to ensure that something like this never happens again. I will assist you in any way that I can.